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In a well-known passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit,  Hegel declared that the sole 
“work and deed” of the French Revolution was: 
death, and indeed a death that has no inner depth or fulfillment;  … the 
coldest, shallowest of deaths, with no more significance than cleaving a 
cabbage head or swallowing a gulp of water.1 
Hegel’s imagery is powerful, but also somewhat obscure.  It is clear enough what he was 
suggesting with the grotesque image of the guillotine as a kitchen utensil, grown to a monstrous 
size and put to a different task.  It speaks to the utter indifference towards death that Hegel saw as 
the hallmark of the Terror:  slicing off the heads of fellow citizens had become no more difficult 
than using a Kohlhobel to slice cabbage for sauerkraut.2  What he was attempting to invoke with 
the other part of the image — the gulp of water — is not so obvious.  Commentators on the 
Phenomenology have provided little in the way of explanation other than noting that, like the 
metaphor of cabbage-cleaving, it shows how routinized death had become:  killing had become 
an act with no more meaning than swallowing a gulp of water.3  But one may still ask:  Why a 
“gulp of water”?  The question, it turns out, is not an idle one. 
Jean Hyppolite once observed that “it is by no means easy to interpret relevant passages 
in the Phenomenology, for they present an inextricable weaving of concrete and particular events 
along with general and universal notions.”4  The image of the “gulp of water,” as we shall see, is 
one such reference to a specific event, dropped into Hegel’s text without comment, presumably 
with the assumption that readers would get the point.  Our failure to pick up the reference 
suggests how differently we approach the Phenomenology than its first, largely baffled, readers.  
Commentators today typically treat the discussion of the French Revolution in the 
Phenomenology as a first draft for either the Lectures on the Philosophy of History  or the 
Philosophy of Right.5  While such a reading may allow us to see how Hegel eventually resolved 
the problems he first posed in the Phenomenology, it incurs the cost of making the development 
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of Hegel’s views on the French Revolution more straightforward than they in fact were.  To 
understand how Hegel sought to make sense of the Terror in the Phenomenology we need to 
look, not to his later works, but rather to the sources on which he drew and the events in the 
recent past which shaped his imagery.  We need to know how Hegel learned about the French 
Revolution, what events in the Revolution struck him as noteworthy, and how he came to 
incorporate these events into his account of the Revolution.  And, appropriately enough, it helps 
a great deal to know what he was alluding to when he invoked the peculiar image of a death as 
cold and empty as “swallowing a gulp of water.”   
We can take, as our point of departure, the letter he wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm Josef 
Schelling on Christmas Eve, 1794.  Hegel had been Schelling’s friend and classmate at the 
seminary in Tübingen when the Revolution broke out, and at the time of the letter had been 
living in Berne for a little over a year, working as a tutor for an old patrician family.  Schelling, 
who was far more successful initially in academic life than Hegel, was at the University of Jena.  
Amid discussions of old friends from the seminary and Schelling’s recent publications, we find 
two paragraphs that provide the earliest written record of Hegel’s reaction to the French 
Revolution: 
By accident I spoke a few days ago with the author of the letters, well 
known to you,  in Archenholz’s Minerva that are signed “O,” and al-
legedly written by an Englishman.  The author, however, is a Silesian and 
is named Oelsner. …  Oelsner is still a young man, but one sees he has 
toiled much.  He is living here this winter on his own means.   … 
You probably know that Carrier has been guillotined.  Do you still read the 
French papers?  …  This trial is very important, and has revealed the 
complete infamy [Schändlichkeit] of the Robespierrists.6 
From this letter we learn that Hegel’s sources for information about the French Revolution 
included the journal Minerva and its correspondent Oelsner.  We also learn what it was about the 
French Revolution that most occupied his attention at the moment:  the trial of Jean-Baptiste 
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Carrier.   If we follow up on these two clues, we will understand both the interpretive context in 
which he first began to make sense of the Terror and the peculiar significance that the “gulp of 
water” had in Hegel’s portrait of the Terror. 
 
“A Silesian … Named Oelsner” 
In December 1794, the twenty-four year old Hegel, fresh from seminary, met Konrad 
Engelbert Oelsner, six years his elder and worn down by the French Revolution.  It is not hard to 
guess who found whom more interesting.  Oelsner had studied law at the University of Frankfurt 
(Oder), with side interests in history, philosophy, medicine, and mathematics.7  After brief stint 
as a tutor in Frankfurt, he left the town — and his academic studies — to journey to Vienna and 
then to Switzerland.  It was here that he received the first reports of the Revolution and, in July of 
1790, moved to Paris, where he settled into the circle of German immigrants and became a 
regular visitor to the Jacobin Club.  His closest ties were with those Girondist deputies who 
would eventually split with Robespierre (he knew Brissot, Condorcet, and Kersaint) and their 
German and Swiss associates, which included Wilhelm von Archenholz, a retired Prussian 
officer, military historian, and journalist.  Archenholz was the editor of Minerva,  an influential 
monthly that from 1792 onward provided German readers with reports on events in Paris and 
translations of documents and articles pertaining to the French Revolution.8  In August 1792, 
Oelsner began a regular series of “Historical Letters on the Most Recent Occurrences in France” 
for the journal.  The letters, which continued monthly until March 1793,  provided a vivid first-
hand account of political events in the capital, interspersed with his own reflections on their 
significance.9 
Hegel was an avid reader of Minerva and, as Jacques D’Hondt has shown, its articles left 
a mark on his subsequent work.10  It was here that he first read portions of Volney’s Les Ruines, 
ou Méditations sur les Révolution des Empires, which he would subsequently draw upon in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.11  It was also here that he encountered a selection from 
Rabaut de Saint-Étienne’s Précis de l’histoire de la Révolution française pour l’année 1792 that 
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dealt with the class structure of the ancien régime  in a fashion that resembles Hegel’s treatment 
of the dialectic of noble and base consciousness in the Phenomenology.12  Oelsner’s reports, 
along with articles by Archenholz and others, were one of Hegel’s chief sources of information 
about the French Revolution. 
Both Archenholz (who left Paris in the summer of 1792) and Oelsner (who stayed on 
until July of 1794) were concerned with the turn the Revolution had taken during the summer of 
1792.  Archenholz published an extended critique of the Jacobin leadership in the August, 1792 
Minerva, denouncing their “political enthusiasm [politischen Schwärmerey]” and expressing 
disgust at their appeal to the basest instincts of the lowest classes in French society.13  Oelsner’s 
reports from Paris more than confirmed Archenholz’s reservations.  He was present at the 
Tuileries on August 10, 1792 and likened the slaughter of the Swiss Guards and the mounting of 
their heads on pikes to a second Saint Bartholomew’s Day.14  Pondering the events that had led to 
the toppling of the monarchy, Oelsner concluded that the “shortsighted politics” of those foreign 
governments who had sought to crush the Revolution had paradoxically provided the impetus for 
a revolution that would sweep Europe, dissolving the ties that bound civil society together. 
In the heart of civilized states there is a race of barbarians [Geschlecht von 
Wilden].  It is by far the most numerous.  I thought of that segment of 
Europeans that had been hardened by poverty while the others had been 
weakened by excess.  Born with the same claims to the goods of nature as 
the great, the rich, the happy, this segment starved.  The animating breath 
[Odem] of philosophy has permeated all the atoms of civil society;  they 
take in hand the knowledge of right and the feeling of power.15 
The events of August 10 had reinforced Oelsner’s long-standing conviction that social reform is 
possible only if it is guided by a “middle class” that is “neither enervated by luxury nor 
barbarized by want.”16  The Jacobin leadership, however, by pandering to the masses and 
embracing Rousseau’s flawed understanding of the social contract, had created a “wild 
democracy” that had reduced a “civilized nation to the deepest barbarity.”17 
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The months that followed bore out Oelsner’s fears.  He was appalled by the September 
Massacres, which he interpreted as part of a plot by the “triumvirate” of Danton, Marat, and 
Robespierre to create a situation of total anarchy as a pretext for imposing a dictatorship.18  He 
denounced the trial and execution of Louis XVI as contrary to public morality, though he granted 
that Louis was guilty of having conspired against the freedom of his people.19  By the summer of 
1793, he was grasping at straws: he regarded Charlotte Corday’s assassination of Marat as an 
“ideal of virtue” that might move others to take arms against Robespierre and he praised her calm 
demeanor on the scaffold as an inspiration to future generations.20  But, by the time of Marat’s 
death, the Gironde had already been expelled from the Convention, and twenty-nine of the 
Girondist deputies had been arrested.  Oelsner was detained for eight days in August, 1793 
during a round-up of foreigners;  fearing for his life, he destroyed all of his unpublished notes 
upon his release.21  He nevertheless remained in Paris through the autumn, as his former 
colleagues perished beneath the guillotine, and stayed on into the spring of the next year, finally 
fleeing the city, nearly penniless, in May, 1794.  Moving between Basel, Zürich, and Berne, he 
continued to write articles that articulated the Girondist critique of the Terror and opposed the 
arguments of German Jacobins such as Georg Forster who saw the Terror as necessitated by 
external threats to the Republic.  He viewed Robespierre’s fall in July, 1794 as a vindication of 
his argument that the events of 1793-94 represented a detour from the proper course of the 
Revolution and in April 1795 he returned to Paris — where he would spend most of the rest of 
his life — to resume the pursuit of the goals that had been thwarted with Robespierre’s rise to 
power.22 
 
“Carrier has been Guillotined” 
It is unclear whether Hegel learned of the trial and execution of Jean-Baptiste Carrier 
from Oelsner or from the unnamed “French newspapers” to which he alluded in his letter to 
Schelling.  It is certain that he could not have learned about it from Minerva, since the January 
issue, which contained the journal’s first discussion of Carrier’s trial, would not have been in his 
Cabbage Heads and Gulps of Water  6 
hands when he wrote to Schelling.23  When learned of Carrier’s trial matters less, however, than 
what he took from it, and the revelation from the trial that seems to have had the greatest 
significance for the imagery he employed in the Phenomenology  leaps out from the frontispiece 
of the January 1795 issue of Minerva.  One glance at it, and it is obvious why the image of the 
“gulp of water” stands on an equal footing with the guillotine in Hegel’s portrait of the Terror. 
[Insert reproduction of frontispiece somewhere below this point] 
The frontispiece, an engraving entitled “Republican Marriages and Fusillades in the 
Vendée in 1794,” depicts a scene of monstrous barbarity.  In the left background a line of 
Republican soldiers fires on a group of unarmed civilians, both men and women.  The viewer’s 
eye, however, is immediately drawn to what is taking place in the right foreground.  On a barge 
stands a couple, stripped naked and bound together.  The woman’s leg is on the gunnel of the 
boat and her head is thrown back as she and her partner recoil from Republican soldiers who, 
with upraised swords and rifle butts, force them out of the boat and into the river.  To their left, in 
the bow of the boat, sits another naked couple;  their hands are tied behind their backs and they 
are bound facing one another, locked in a pathetic embrace as they await their fate.  The river 
below is filled with other men and women, tied together, struggling in vain against their bonds 
and against the current.  The bow of the boat plows into the lifeless bodies of a couple who have 
already perished in the river.   
The frontispiece depicts the most notorious of the official charges brought by the 
Revolutionary Tribunal against Jean-Baptiste Carrier, the Committee of Public Safety’s 
representative en mission to the armée révolutionnaire in Nantes:  that, under Carrier’s orders, 
troops carried out “republican marriages,” which “consisted in stripping a young man and a 
young woman naked, binding them to one another, and throwing them into the water.”24  Inside 
the January Minerva,  a complete list of the charges against Carrier could be found.  Drownings 
turn up with numbing regularity.  It was charged that, one night, Carrier “had three beautiful 
women drowned, after he had made use of them.”25 On another occasion, he had a certain woman 
taken off the street, brought to him, and “after he had enjoyed her, he had her drowned.”26 At his 
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command, “pregnant women were drowned with a number of good patriots.”27  He ordered that 
another man to be drowned because he tried to prevent Carrier from raping one of these pregnant 
women.28  When a young woman sought permission to give her imprisoned brother some bread, 
he replied that no bread was necessary since he had enough water to drink and, the next night, 
drowned the prisoner.29  When wagons carrying 300 more prisoners arrived and their guards 
inquired where they should be placed, Carrier ordered that they all be “thrown into the water.”30  
Night after night he emptied his prisons, arranging mass drownings of prisoners, indifferent to 
the fact that his victims included “women, girls, and children.”31  For thirty-seven pages the 
accusations rolled on, painting the portrait of a monster.   
Whether Carrier actually did all of things he was charged with doing has remained a 
subject of debate.  The Tribunal concluded that his role in instigating “Republican Marriages” 
could not be proven, and some subsequent commentators have questioned whether any 
“Republican Marriages” took place.32  But certain facts are beyond dispute.33  He arrived in 
Nantes in October 1793, sent by the Committee of Public Safety to oversee the response to the 
insurrection in the Vendée.  The previous March, masses of peasants protesting the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy took up pitchforks, sickles, and hunting rifles and overran two district 
capitals north of the Loire, killing four administrators.  While troops were able to restore order 
relatively quickly in the regions north of the river, the poorly armed Republican troops to the 
south, many of them pinned down on the coast anticipating an invasion from England, proved to 
be no match for armies of peasants who sometimes numbered as high as a hundred thousand and 
overran most of the towns in the region, with bloody massacres at Cholet in the Maine-et-Loire 
and Machecoul in the Loire-Inférieure. 
By the time Carrier arrived, the tide had begun to turn against the insurgents, who 
suffered a major setback at Cholet on October 17.  Almost immediately upon his arrival, acting 
on the rumor that there was a plot afoot against him, he had 132 of the leading citizens of Nantes 
arrested and sent on foot to Paris to stand trial;  thirty-five died during the brutal forty-day forced 
march.  Fearing that the captives who filled the prison in Nantes were plotting an insurrection, 
Cabbage Heads and Gulps of Water  8 
and if successful might link up with rebel forces, Carrier directed the commandant to execute 
between 800 to 900 prisoners.34  Firing squads were soon supplemented by mass drownings in 
the Loire, in which prisoners were strapped into boats which were then sunk in the river — 
Carrier’s term of art for the technique was “vertical deportation.”35  Finally, in retaliation for the 
massacres of republican officials and soldiers, Carrier converted much of the Vendée into a free-
fire zone, ordering troops (as he reported to the Committee of Public Safety) “to put to death in 
all the insurgent regions everyone of either sex who is found there.”36  “It is a humanitarian 
principle with me,” he explained in a letter to the Convention, “to purge the earth of the liberty of 
these monsters.”37  In the midst of this mayhem, rumors about “Republican Marriages” and tales 
of Carrier’s own personal depravity began to circulate. 
He was recalled to Paris early February, 1795, after Marc-Antoine Julien, sent by 
Robespierre as part of an effort to gain control over the actions of representatives en mission, 
submitted a report about the situation in Nantes that must have confirmed the Committee of 
Public Safety’s worst fears about the activities of its representatives in the provinces.38  Julien 
reported that the army in Nantes was without discipline, that the bodies of the executed lay 
unburied polluting the air while the Loire flowed red with blood, and that Carrier himself was 
“invisible to all constituted bodies,” having secreted himself in “a seraglio, surrounded by 
insolent sultanesses” and accessible only to his staff, “who ceaselessly fawn upon him.”  
Carrier’s spies were everywhere, Julien reported, and even good patriots were harassed.  “Public 
spirit is dead,” he concluded, “liberty no longer exists.  In Nantes I have seen the ancien 
régime.”39   
Carrier survived the purges and executions of the Spring of 1794 that accompanied 
Robespierre’s attempt to centralize control over the Terror and lived to play a role in the toppling 
of Robespierre at the end of July (one can assume that an interest in self-preservation may have 
provided an incentive).40  But he could not avoid being implicated in the investigations into the 
functioning of the Terror that began with Robespierre’s fall.  Appropriately enough, the trial of 
the citizens that Carrier had sent from Nantes to Paris started the process that led to his own 
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execution.  Their trial began in early September and almost immediately turned into a trial of 
those who had oppressed them.41  Reports of both the horrors of their forced march to Paris and 
of the atrocities committed by Carrier in Nantes filled Paris newspapers and were promptly 
picked up by Minerva, which published a diary of one of the citizens, along with other reports of 
their ordeal.42 The citizens were acquitted and proceedings were begun against the Revolutionary 
Committee of Nantes on October 14 and against Carrier himself on November 24.  The 
Committee responded to the accusations against them by blaming Carrier.  Carrier, in turn,  
responded by claiming that the crimes he was alleged to have committed were either fabricated 
or — when he could not deny their veracity — had been necessitated by the exigencies of the 
situation.  He also insisted, attempting to implicate those who would judge him, that he had kept 
the Committee of Public Safety informed of his actions, and at least some of his reports had been 
read before the Convention itself.  His defense was not convincing enough to save him from the 
guillotine, but it did raise enough questions about how much the Committee of Public Safety and 
the Convention knew about what he was doing to lead some to conclude that the atrocities in 
Nantes could not be attributed to the depravity of one individual, but instead suggested that the 
entire ruling apparatus was responsible.43 
 
“The Complete Infamy of the Robespierrists” 
It is thus hardly surprising that Hegel should view Carrier’s trial with interest.  For 
anyone even remotely concerned with developments in France, the trial was an event of enor-
mous significance.  Nor is it surprising that he would opine to Schelling that the trial “revealed 
the complete infamy of the Robespierrists.”  On that there was also general agreement:  the trial 
of Carrier raised fundamental questions about the course of the Revolution since Robespierre’s 
rise to power.  But during the winter of 1794-1795 there was still a certain ambiguity as to what 
exactly constituted the “infamy” of Robespierre and his followers.  A number of different 
answers were possible, and the contest between them suggests the different ways in which those 
who had lived through the Terror sought to make sense of it.44   
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Julien’s complaint against Carrier was that he had brought the ancien régime back to life.  
In this interpretation, in which the image of Carrier as a “new Nero” figures prominently, 
Carrier’s infamy rests with his failure to control the actions of the army, his cultivation of a 
sumptuous life style, and his sexual depravity.  His sinking of boats filled with priests and 
prisoners figures less prominently in this accounting than his drowning of the women he had 
“used” or his failure to prevent his troops from performing “Republican Marriages.” Those who 
saw Carrier’s infamy as residing in his reestablishing of something resembling ancien régime  
might excuse the mass drownings of priests and prisoners as necessary for the reestablishment of 
control over the region.45  The prisons, they could concede, were overcrowded and the prisoners 
might well have been plotting to turn on the outnumbered forces who guarded them.  Certainly, 
the slaughter of Republican officials the previous Spring served as a grim reminder of how 
fragile control over the region was.46  Further, the fact that there was already an elaborate 
vocabulary at hand which portrayed the Vendéens as subhuman — they were “brigands,” 
“fanatics,” “an abominable race infatuated by royalism and superstition” — may have made it 
easier to overlook some of Carrier’s actions.47  But the drowning of the women he had “enjoyed” 
or his troops’ drowning of young couples for sport were acts that defied any calculus of 
necessity.  They recalled a type of violence whose roots went deep in the ancien régime — a 
violence that the Terror was intended to replace. 
The Phenomenology was remarkably acute in its understanding of the logic of the Terror.  
Its purpose was to substitute a “cold and empty” death for a type of death that was anything but 
cold or empty:  the spontaneous and grotesque popular violence that exploded in the first two 
years of the Revolution.  Recall the fate of Bertier de Sauvigny and Joseph François Foulon, both 
of whom were murdered by crowds in the summer of 1789.  After Foulon, who was accused of 
complicity in a plot to starve the population, was decapitated by the crowd that had “arrested” 
him, his mouth was stuffed with hay and his head was mounted on a pike that was carried 
through the streets.  The trunk of his body was pulled along behind, until nothing was left but a 
bloody pulp.  Along the parade route, the crowd presented the head to his son-in-law, Bertier de 
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Sauvigny, who was in turn mutilated, with his head and heart mounted on pikes and paraded 
through the streets.48   
Compared to spectacles such as these, the guillotine could at least claim to be a more 
civilized means of disposing of the enemies of the state.  It extended to all citizens a form of 
execution that had once been the prerogative of the nobility.  During the ancien régime, 
decapitation had been viewed as less demeaning than hanging (and, presumably, less painful), 
but it required a complaisant victim capable of remaining motionless on the block while the 
executioner went about a task that required a certain measure of skill.  The guillotine asked less 
of its victims (tied to a plank their necks would remain in the proper position even if they were so 
ignoble as to faint or struggle) and less of those who operated it (physical skill and a properly 
sharpened sword were no longer part of the job description of the executioner).49  Indeed, the 
“spectacle” of the guillotine was so rapid — the blade fell, there was quick spurt of blood, and 
the show was over —  that those who came to observe the first executions were disappointed.   
Hence the ritual of a long procession of the condemned through the streets prior to execution was 
substituted for the parade of body parts that had been a standard feature of popular violence.  A 
final display of the severed head became the responsibility of the executioner, who was now 
unique in being the only one permitted to touch the body of the executed.50 
The public’s passion for blood spectacles was nothing new.  It had roots in the practices 
of the ancien régime:  the famous execution of the would-be regicide Damiens was, after all, 
anything but “cold and empty.”  It went on for hours, much to the satisfaction of the crowd if to 
the consternation of the executioners, who had a difficult time finishing their task.  That the 
Revolution was,  from the start, bathed in blood, is beyond dispute.  But to say, as Simon Schama 
does, that “The Terror was merely 1789 with a higher body count” misses an important nuance.51  
The body count during the Terror could be higher because the character of the violence had 
changed.  The popular violence of the first years of the Revolution, like the public cruelties of the 
ancien régime,  was excessive in intensity but — at least until the September Massacres — 
relatively restrained in the number of victims.  Cruelty this spectacular was, if nothing else, 
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rather time-consuming.  In attempting to wrest control of violence from the population and to 
provide a state-sanctioned cruelty that would spare the people the necessity of being cruel, the 
Terror wound up installing a form of execution that was a good deal more efficient than the 
forms it replaced, hence the possibility of a “higher body count.”  When death becomes as easy 
as chopping cabbages, the technical means were at hand for slaughter on a mass scale.52 
Thus, at the moment when Hegel was telling Schelling that Carrier’s trial revealed the 
“complete infamy of the Robespierrists,” two different interpretation of what was “infamous” 
about Carrier’s actions were possible, differences that were mirrored in the two different forms 
taken by his peculiar innovation in the technology of revolutionary murder — execution by 
drowning.  The mass drownings of prisoners and priests were even more brutally efficient than 
the guillotine, permitting a small number of terrorists to dispose of a large number of victims in a 
relatively short span of time.53  In contrast, “Republican Marriages,” like Carrier’s alleged 
murder of the women he raped, evoked a cruelty of a rather different sort:  more intimate, more 
lurid, and more leisurely.  In the list of formal charges against Carrier the attention devoted to 
this second type of drowning almost crowds out the mass drownings of prisoners, just as the 
representation of “Republican Marriages” in Minerva thrusts the mass executions by firing 
squads into the background.  One possible explanation for this peculiar emphasis lies in the 
general character of the Thermidorian reaction to the Revolution itself. 
Julien’s claim in his report to Robespierre that Carrier had restored the ancien régime 
bears an uncanny resemblance to the accusations that would eventually be raised against 
Robespierre himself.  In his exhaustive examination of the evolution of political discourse during 
Thermidor, Bronislaw Baczko has traced the history of the curious rumor that spread through 
Paris on the night of 9 and 10 Thermidor:  that Robespierre planned to marry the daughter of 
Louis XVI and proclaim himself king.54  For those who found the rumor plausible, Robespierre’s 
infamy resided in his attempt to become not simply “the new Cromwell, the new Cataline” — the 
epithets hurled at him on the morning of 9 Thermidor — but rather the next Louis.  Thus, at least 
in the first round of charges, Robespierre’s infamy, like Carrier’s, lay not in his having driven the 
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flawed logic of the Revolution to its bloody conclusion, but rather in his having turned traitor 
against the otherwise praiseworthy ideals of the Revolution.   
Strange though charges of this sort might be to us, they would not have been unfamiliar to 
Hegel.  He could have heard such an analysis first hand from Oelsner who, as we have seen, 
viewed the Terror as the creature of the machinations of Robespierre, Danton, and Marat.  He 
could also have read such an analysis in the curious pamphlet translated in the December 1794 
Minerva bearing the title:   “The Jacobins as Aristocrats, Federalists, and Counter-
revolutionaries.  Finally their horrible secrets are revealed!”55  It charged that the Jacobin Society 
was “the cradle of a new aristocracy” which, under the leadership of Robespierre, entered into a 
secret plot (allegedly supported by Pitt and other enemies of the Revolution) with Federalist 
societies in Dijon, Marseilles, and Grenoble.56  Its aim was to provoke a counterrevolution 
against the principles of “liberty and equality” that the Revolution had established and to create a 
system where the Jacobins and their allies had control over all public offices.57  It argued that 
Robespierre and his allies — and the pamphlet places Carrier in the inner circle of Couthon, 
Duhem, St. Just, Barère, and Collot-d’Herbois58 — had nothing to lose by promoting anarchy and 
counter-revolution, since this gave them the excuse to expel the Gironde and to launch the 
Terror.59 
As Baczko has suggested, conspiracy stories such as these flourished in the wake of 
Robespierre’s fall in part because they provided an explanation for the Terror that stayed within 
the terms of discourse that had been laid out by the Terror itself.  Fears of foreign plots, rumors 
about efforts to reestablish the monarchy, secret alliances between counter-revolutionary 
movements in the provinces — these were all standard elements of Jacobin rhetoric.  At the onset 
of the Thermidor, the path of least resistance would be to turn this analysis against those who had 
once deployed it.  To focus on the Carrier’s excesses or to see Robespierre as a would-be tyrant 
was thus to mount a criticism of those who put the Terror into practice which left the broader 
question of the relationship of the Terror to the Revolution unexamined.  It condemned excessive 
or counter-revolutionary violence but left the Revolution unscathed.  Only later would another 
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analysis of the Terror emerge, one that traced the roots of the Terror not to the infamy of a few 
individuals who lusted after power, but which instead came to the more disturbing conclusion 
that perhaps it was something in the Revolution itself that propelled it into the Terror. 
The fact that Carrier’s trial held such an interest for Hegel shows that in December 1794 
he was, in his own way, working through the same sets of questions that dominated debate in 
Paris during Thermidor.  The letter to Schelling, however, was silent on a crucial point:  just 
what constituted the “infamy of the Robespierrists”?  Was it that they, as Oelsner maintained,  
had betrayed the Revolution by seeking to establish a new aristocracy that would mimic all the 
worst features of the ancien régime?  Or was it that they demonstrated a basic failing within the 
revolutionary project itself?  In the Phenomenology  Hegel cast his lot with the latter account.  
But it is not at all clear that he had reached this conclusion by the end of 1794.  Indeed, the 
evidence we have suggests that the path which led him to this conclusion is a bit more 
complicated than is sometimes assumed. 
 
Robespierre as Theseus, or the Necessity of Infamy 
The argument that the Terror necessarily followed from the premises of the Revolution 
emerged only gradually in Hegel’s notes and drafts over the dozen years of work that separated 
his letter to Schelling from the completion of the Phenomenology.  One particularly significant 
step in the development of Hegel’s view of the French Revolution is preserved in a fragment, 
originally published in Karl Rosenkranz’s biography of Hegel, that dates from either Hegel’s 
days in Berne or Frankfurt.  In it, Hegel contrasted the way in which modern states respected 
property rights with the attitude of ancient republics, whose constitutions “frequently encroached 
upon the strict rights of property.”  Observing that in the Athenian polis, the Roman republic, and 
the Florentine city-state the “disproportionate wealth of a few citizens” posed a threat to public 
liberty, Hegel suggested, “It would be an important inquiry to see how many of the strict rights of 
property would have to be sacrificed if a stable form of a republic were to be introduced.”  He 
concluded, “Perhaps the system of the sans-culottes has been done a grave injustice by those who 
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see rapacity as the sole motive underlying their wish for a greater equality of wealth.”60 
Hegel’s suggestion that the “sans-culotte” concern with equality might have a basis other 
than a desire for plunder is significant both for what it rejects and for what it implies.  The image 
of the rapacious sans-culotte had figured prominently in representations of Republican 
Marriages.  One popular engraving of a Republican Marriage depicts a sans-cullote soldier 
carrying away the clothing of a couple prior to their being bound and drowned.61  The theft of 
clothing also played a role in accounts of executions performed by the armée révolutionnaire in 
the Vendée.  In the engraving in Minerva depicting fusillades and Republican Marriages the 
victims of the firing squads appear to have been stripped of their clothing, presumably by an 
army that was collecting booty.  The sadistic eroticism of Republican Marriages was thus alleged 
to be the creature of a desire that went deeper than a perverse sexual cruelty:  sans-culottes were 
men who, above all else, craved the property of others.   
By the time of the fragment quoted above (which at the latest dates from 1798) Hegel had 
come to see “the system of the sans-culottes” in a somewhat different light.  The concern with 
property could not be written off to their rapacity.  Instead it spoke to central concerns within the 
republican tradition:  How could a citizenry which was concerned with amassing private gain 
possibly cultivate the civic virtues that were demanded for the survival of a republic?  How could 
one speak of a “public interest” in a community where, because of massive differences in wealth, 
individuals lived lives that had little in common?  To ask such questions was to begin to see the 
actions of the sans-culottes as motivated by something other than a desire for individual gain.  
They were playing out in history the same complex relationship between equality and liberty that 
Hegel had encountered in his reading of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.  Thus the 
sans-culottes began, for Hegel, to shed the image of rapacity and instead became good 
republicans. 
The image of Robespierre also underwent a significant modification in Hegel’s writings 
during the decade prior to the completion of the Phenomenology.  Robespierre enters the Jena 
lectures on the “Philosophy of Spirit” of 1805-1806 not in the role of a Cataline who betrays the 
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republic but rather in the unlikely guise of a modern Theseus, the figure who stands at the very 
origin of free cities.62  Discussions of Theseus had long occupied an important place in Hegel’s 
writings.63  For Hegel, the legendary founder of Athens symbolized the step that inaugurated 
political life:  he brought scattered clans living in a state of rural dispersion together into a polis 
and infused them with a sense of political solidarity by establishing a civic religion.  The task 
facing a modern Theseus would be even more daunting:  Hegel’s reflections on modern political 
life time and again emphasized how self-seeking, private individuals — which he, following 
Rousseau, dubbed the bourgeois — could not achieve the public-mindedness that was the 
hallmark of the citoyen.64  His unpublished essay The German Constitution (written between 
1800 and 1802) surveyed a hopelessly divided Germany and concluded that it would take a new 
Theseus to make Germany into a unified state, noting that  “an event of that sort has never been 
the fruit of deliberation, but only of force.”65 
The tension between bourgeois and citoyen returns in different forms throughout Hegel’s 
writings from the Jena period.  His discussion of natural law theories in the Critical Journal of 
Philosophy (1802-3) juxtaposes a class of individuals who live for the sake of the polity as a 
whole to those who look out only for their own interests.66  Its companion piece, the unpublished 
System der Sittlichkeit (1802), posits a similar dichotomy between a “system of need” — which 
is concerned with the reproduction of material life — and the systems of “justice” and 
“discipline”  — which seek to bind otherwise separate individuals together into a community 
with a common purpose.67  The same concerns reappear in Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of 
Spirit, culminating with the comparison of Robespierre and Theseus at the close of the 1805-
1806 series.  The problem, as before, is how to infuse individuals with a sense of a common 
purpose.  Echoing the Machiavellian language of The German Constitution, Hegel observes that 
states can only be established “through the noble force of great men.” 
In this way Theseus established the Athenian state.  And thus, in the 
French Revolution, a fearful force sustained the state ….  This force is not 
despotism but tyranny, pure horrifying domination.  Yet it is necessary and 
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just, insofar as it constitutes and sustains the state as this actual 
individual.68 
Tyranny, however, does not last.  It is overthrown not “because it is abhorrent, vile, and so on” 
but rather because it has become “superfluous.” 
The memory of the tyrant becomes abhorrent.  … Robespierre was dealt 
with in this way — his power left him because necessity had left him, and 
thus he was overthrown by force.  That which is necessary happens — but 
every part of necessity is usually allotted only to individuals.  The one is 
accuser and defender, the other a judge, the third a hangman — but all are 
necessary.69 
Robespierre’s “infamy,”  like the rapacity of the sans-culottes, now appears in a different light.  
We have moved away from an evaluation of the Terror which, like Oelsner, would search for the 
point where the evil of particular individuals misled the Revolution into Terror.  Terror now be-
came a necessary part of politics — it is the force that rips individuals out of themselves and 
binds them together into a republic.    
An interpretation of Hegel’s relationship to the Revolution that portrays him as an early 
enthusiast who, dismayed by the Terror, came to see the failings of its naive attempt to revive 
ancient republican virtue thus misses a few odd twists in the evolution of his thinking.  Hegel, 
like others, hailed the Revolution at first, then — again like others — was appalled by the 
revelations of the Thermidor period.  But then, pursuing a path that others did not follow, he 
came to regard the atrocities of the Terror as somehow necessary.  For this reason, his 
interpretation of the French Revolution cannot be likened to that of Burke or to German 
Burkeans like Friedrich Gentz, A. W. Rehberg, or Ernst Brandes.  While much of Hegel’s 
language resembles Burke’s, his account is, in a fundamental sense, opposed to that of the 
Reflections on the Revolution in France.70  For Burke the Revolution was a mistake, the result of 
a terrible foolishness that ought to, and perhaps could, have been avoided.  While Hegel agreed 
that Revolution culminated in disaster, he was not so sure that this was a catastrophe that could 
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— and perhaps even ought to — have been avoided.  The account of the Terror in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit was devoted to elaborating this most peculiar of claims.  
 
The Legacy of Enlightenment:  Unsatisfying Death and Furious Destruction 
Images of death — and, more specifically, murder — turn up with unsettling regularity in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit.  Sometimes organic metaphors are deployed:  in the struggle to 
grasp an object a concept is driven beyond itself, and “this uprooting entails its death.”71  
Sometimes Hegel’s language is theological:  the whole process of concepts going beyond 
themselves is likened to the “stations” on the Via Delorosa  and Phenomenology itself is 
characterized as the “Golgotha of the absolute spirit.”72  The book devotes a whole section to the 
failings of phrenology, a science that sought to explain spirit by interrogating a caput mortuum.73  
And, in an episode on which Alexandre Kojève built an entire career, two individuals, intent on 
proving their self-sufficiency, stage a fight to the death.  Hegel’s “Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness” is clearly not a Fröhliche Wissenschaft. 
Like the more familiar discussion of the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage, one of the 
central themes of Hegel’s account of the Terror is that murder is, ultimately, a rather unsatisfying 
experience.  In the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage, two antagonists,  seeking recognition as 
autonomous beings, battle to the death.  As is well known, the winner also loses:  dead men grant 
no recognition.  And so we move onward through the frustrations of mastery and servitude 
(recognition by a slave doesn’t count for much either), the travails of the Unhappy 
Consciousness, the bizarre world of the “spiritual animal kingdom,” the tragic collisions of 
Antigone and Creon, the frustrating exchanges between Moi and Lui in Rameau’s Nephew, the 
inconclusive struggle between Enlightenment and Superstition and finally come, still unsatisfied, 
to the chapter on “Absolute Freedom and Terror” where we find ourselves contemplating “a 
death that has no inner depth or fulfillment;  … the coldest, shallowest of deaths.”74  The Terror 
thus enters the pages of the Phenomenology as one more example of the fruitless effort to master 
objectivity by killing it. 
Cabbage Heads and Gulps of Water  19 
The Enlightenment plays a pivotal role in Hegel’s account of the path that leads to the 
Terror.  For us the idea that there is some type of connection between the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution is so hackneyed as to be unexceptional.  But this overlooks how vital a 
question this relationship still was in 1806.  For well over a decade the issue of whether 
enlightenment caused revolutions had been hotly disputed.  Some defenders of enlightenment 
had viewed the very idea of revolution as suspect.  Writing a year before the French Revolution, 
the enlightened Berlin clergyman Andreas Riem described the “Patriot Rebellion” in Holland as 
the work of “unenlightened demagogues” and viewed the American war of independence as a 
misfortune that could have been avoided had there been more enlightened leadership in England 
and in the colonies.75  Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk, the editor of the first collection of Kant’s 
works, came to much the same conclusion in a 1794 essay.  Far from promoting violent 
revolutions, he argued, “True enlightenment … is … the only way to work against them 
successfully.”76  A year later, Johann Adam Bergk, a younger and more politically radical 
follower of Kant, came to rather different conclusions.  He argued that revolutions occurred when 
the “moral enlightenment” of a people has evolved to the point where they were capable of 
recognizing rights and duties and of demanding that material conditions “correspond with the 
pronouncements of conscience.” Revolutions are unavoidable “if the nation recognizes or senses 
the injustices that burden it and mock its humanity.”  Enlightenment thus stands “justly accused 
as the cause of revolutions,”  but for Bergk there can be no question of restraining enlightenment, 
since “once enlightenment spreads its roots in a nation,  it is easier to exterminate mankind than 
to exterminate enlightenment.”77  
The debate over the linkage between enlightenment and revolution persisted into the new 
century,  with Jakob Salat — one of those inconsequential but prolific philosophers who populate 
the early nineteenth century — producing a steady flow of books and articles on the possible 
dangers of enlightenment, the folly of trying to resist enlightenment, and the question of whether 
enlightenment leads to revolution.78  Distinguishing between enlightenment as a final “and in 
itself entirely innocent” step in the chain of causes that produces revolutions and enlightenment 
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as “in itself” a cause of revolutions, Salat argued that in the French case the primary causes of 
revolution were to be sought in the political and religious circumstances that had for so long 
retarded the spread of enlightenment in France.79  While he maintained that a fully enlightened 
state would face no difficulties, Salat was willing to grant that the process of a people’s becoming 
enlightened was fraught with dangers.  But the only recourse against these dangers was to deploy 
a “higher level” of enlightenment against those “misuses” of enlightenment that were possible at 
“lower stages” of enlightenment (unfortunately, Salat was never terribly clear as to how to 
distinguish “higher” from “lower” or “use” from “misuse”).80  For Salat, then, the French 
Revolution was the result of a delayed and botched enlightenment, driven onward by the “half-
true philosophy of a Helvetius, Voltaire, Diderot, Raynal, D’Alembert, etc.”81  An enlightenment 
carried out under the aegis of a “Mendelssohn, Garve, Jacobi, Kant” or a “Herder, Dalberg, 
Wieland, Reinhold, Fichte, Schiller, etc.” held brighter prospects.82 
Hegel was familiar with Salat’s work and utterly contemptuous of it.  A brief notice in the 
March 1802 issue of the Critical Journal of Philosophy expressed disgust at the “sanctimonious 
moral drivel and asthenic salads [moralische Salbadereien und asthenische Saläte]” that Salat 
had served up in his attempt to present the “Berlin Aufklärei in its most trivial form as a moral 
and human enlightenment [Aufklärung].”83  Hegel’s animus against Salat may in part be 
attributed to Salat’s role as a defender of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and, hence, an opponent of 
the philosophical system Hegel and Schelling were attempting to articulate.84  But Hegel’s 
contempt may also be explained by the fact that in praising the Berlin Aufklärer  for avoiding the 
failings of the French philosophes  Salat was defending a version of the Enlightenment with 
which Hegel had once identified, but which he had come to reject.  As a gymnasium student in 
Stuttgart, Hegel had filled his notebook with extracts from the writings of representatives of the 
Berlin Enlightenment.    Indeed, an entry from May 1787 contains an almost complete 
transcription of Moses Mendelssohn’s famous 1784 response to the question “What is 
Enlightenment?”85  At seminary in Tübingen, Hegel had come to question this entire approach, 
and devoted a pivotal section of the “Tübingen Essay” of 1793 to a critique of enlightenment 
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accounts of religion, concluding that enlightenment could not supplant faith because it was 
fundamentally incapable of moving men to moral action.86 
Whatever the motivation for Hegel’s disgust with Salat’s account of the relationship 
between enlightenment and revolution, what is striking about the rival version Hegel offered in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit  is how thoroughly it ignored the distinction that Salat and others 
before him had drawn between the consequences of the French and the German Enlightenment.  
Hegel approached the Enlightenment not by analysing the writings of particular thinkers, but 
rather by tracing the implications of the category that he sees as governing enlightenment’s 
interactions with the world:  “utility.”  The category of utility views the world as an entity whose 
“being-in-itself” consists of its “being-for-another”:  the world has meaning only in so far as it 
serves the purposes of an other.  But this “other,” Hegel argues, cannot be an individual subject, 
pursuing particular projects, but rather must take the form of a “universal Subject” possessing a 
“general will, the will of all individuals as such.”87  Thus Hegel’s argument moves rather swiftly 
from a working out of the implications of the concept of “utility” to a discussion of the 
difficulties that plague the idea of a “general will.”  
This connection between “utility” and “general will” is not as tenuous as it might seem on 
first glance, especially if we remember that when Hegel spoke of “utility” he had in mind 
thinkers like Barnave or Siéyès rather than Hume or Bentham.88  It is also worth remembering 
that Rousseau himself had begun the Social Contract by insisting that his aim was to reconcile 
what “right sanctions” with what “is prescribed by interest,” so that considerations of “justice” 
and “utility” would not be separated.  Thus, in Hegel’s view, the critical failing of the 
Enlightenment’s notion of utility resided in the difficulty of reconciling the aggregate of 
particular, individual utilities (what Rousseau would call the “will of all”) with the “general 
will.”89  Such a feat is possible only if a political system can be created in which each individual 
separately wills what all other members of the community will and in which every act by the 
collectivity appears as “the direct and conscious deed of each.”90  As the French Revolution 
amply demonstrated, this is not easily done. 
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In Hegel’s account of the education of Spirit, the French Revolution represents the point 
at which Spirit “comes before us as absolute freedom.”91  It is a world in which everything that 
Spirit encounters must appear as “simply its own will, and this is a general will.”  Hence, the 
traditional division of individuals into differing estates or corporative bodies collapses, as each 
individual consciousness “raises itself out of its allotted sphere, no longer finds its essence and its 
work in a particular sphere, but grasps itself as the concept of will, grasps all spheres as the 
essence of this will, and therefore can realize itself only in a work which is a work of the 
whole.”92  Once we have reached this stage in Hegel’s analysis, the initial distinction between a 
subject seeking to realize projects and a world of objects held to be useful for the achievement of 
these projects is supplanted by an ultimately more sinister division:  “the difference between the 
individual and the universal consciousness.”93  In the fatal dialectic that unfolds, any attempt by 
the individual consciousness to maintain itself apart from the universal consciousness — whether 
in the form of membership in a particular estate or class, representation in a particular branch of a 
government divided into legislative, judicial, and executive branches, or even as an appeal to a 
spiritual “beyond” which grants some sort of dignity to the individual person — is relentlessly 
crushed.94   The historical references for this part of Hegel’s account are not difficult to grasp:  
the reconstitution of the Estates General as the National Assembly abolished the old corporative 
distinctions, the ideal of direct democracy pushed the Revolution beyond the English solution of 
a mixed constitution, and the elaborate revolutionary festivals sought to find substitutes, within 
the political domain, for rituals that had bound congregations together in the pursuit of 
otherworldly ends.  Hegel’s central point is that while efforts such as these were successful in 
tearing down what preceded them, they proved to be singularly incapable of creating a new 
order.  “Universal freedom,” he  argues,  “can produce neither a positive work nor a deed;  there 
is left for it only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction.”95 
The political implications of this failure are clear enough.  Whenever the government, 
claiming to act in the name of the “general will,” executes a plan of action, it reveals itself to be 
nothing more than a “faction” which stands opposed to the amorphous and disembodied “general 
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will.”   
What is called government is merely the victorious faction, and in the very 
fact of its being a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow;  and its 
being government makes it, conversely, into a faction, and guilty.96 
Once toppled, a faction has no way to deny its guilt.  It stands condemned for the specific deeds 
and actions which it carried out,  and it faces an accuser that, since it has not yet acted and hence 
remains “only an unreal pure will,”  will always have the purest of intentions.   
Being suspected, therefore, takes the place, has the significance and effect, 
of being guilty; and the external reaction against this reality, which rests on 
the simple inwardness of intention, consists in the cold, matter-of-fact 
annihilation of this existent self, from which nothing can be taken away 
except for its mere being. 97 
Regimes replace regimes, the accusers become the accused, and those who yesterday were the 
executioners today mount the scaffold.  Hegel had learned the lessons of the Carrier trial well. 
The Terror, for Hegel, thus came to be defined by its sole accomplishment:  a death that is 
so empty and unfulfilling that the state can never be done with its work, “for what is negated is 
the empty point of an absolutely free self.”98  The very emptiness of what is destroyed — “an 
absolutely free self” rather than a particular human being, defined by particular characteristics — 
sets the stage for a slaughter that is unending simply because it is so empty.  The image of the 
Kohlhobel effortlessly — and repeatedly — cleaving a head of cabbage captures Hegel’s point 
with chilling accuracy.  Murder has been sanitized:  in operating a guillotine, the executioner no 
longer aims a sword a the neck of a fellow human;  instead he cuts a rope that releases the blade 
that removes a head.  In the mass drownings in the Vendée, Carrier’s men removed the pieces of 
wood that covered holes that had been drilled in the bottom of the boats to which their victims 
were chained; in contrast to the depiction of “Republican Marriages” in Minerva, they do not 
have to force struggling bodies into the water.  Those slaughtered are no longer specific individ-
uals, responsible for specific deeds.  Rather, their sole crime is that of having been defined as 
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something other than the general will.  In rising against the Republic, the “inexplicables 
Vendéens” had renounced their status as citizens protected by law and become “brigands” at war 
with society.99  The Terror thus takes up a project which, in principle, can never be completed:  
the destruction of everything that stands opposed to the general will. 
How, then, can the Terror ever be brought to an end?  The Phenomenology briefly toys 
with a vision of history as a grueling process in which peoples, having experienced the rule of an 
absolute tyrant and felt the fear of death forsake the dream of absolute freedom and “return to an 
apportioned and limited task.”100 
Out of this tumult, Spirit would be thrown back to its starting point, to the 
ethical and real world of culture, which would have been merely refreshed 
and rejuvenated by the fear of the lord and master which has again entered 
men’s hearts.101 
We escape from this grim prospect of a history which continually replays a “cycle of necessity” 
only because the culture which the Terror has destroyed is, according to Hegel, “the grandest and 
the last.” In its demise we come face to face with the “sheer terror of the negative” in the form of 
“death without meaning.”   With the destruction of everything that once opposed the general will, 
Hegel tells us that, “There has arisen the new shape of Spirit, that of the moral Spirit.”102  
Suddenly freed from the unpleasant prospect of having to go back to the world of ethical life and 
start over again, the Spirit somehow finds an escape hatch that leads to the world of “Self-Certain 
Spirit.  Morality.” 
Transitions are not the Phenomenology’s strong point, and the leap which takes us from 
the Terror to the “moral view of the world” is not one of the more convincing moments in 
Hegel’s strange Bildungsroman of the Spirit.  The account of culture has seemingly reached a 
fatal impasse when suddenly the argument resumes on a completely different level.  In the 
discussion of morality that follows, the opposition between general will and particular will is 
internalized within the conscience of the individual in the form of the struggle between the moral 
law and individual inclination.  We have left the domain of history and politics behind, and the 
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Phenomenology concludes with discussions of moral life, art, religion, and philosophy.  In the 
ascent to “absolute wisdom” political problems have been left behind;  which is not to say that 
they have been solved.   
 
Salat’s Revenge:  The Unnecessary Revolution 
Lecturing on the philosophy of history to his students in Berlin a decade and a half later, 
Hegel explained, “It has been said that the French Revolution resulted from philosophy.”  While 
he granted that such assertions could not be denied, he reminded them that the philosophy which 
produced the Revolution was “only abstract thought, not the concrete comprehension of absolute 
truth.”103  While he continued to stress, in those same lectures, that the Revolution was the 
epochal event that inaugurated the modern age, something has changed between the 
Phenomenology and the Lectures on the Philosophy of History.  In the Phenomenology, 
Enlightenment begat the Revolution which climaxed with the Terror, an event which ran down 
the curtain on the world of culture.  In his later lecture cycles, Enlightenment, Revolution, and 
Terror were less tightly woven together. 
The Phenomenology offered an account of “Die Aufklärung” that was seemingly 
inhabited solely by French thinkers.  This allowed for much too neat an account:  each of the 
three “worlds” surveyed in the chapter on Geist corresponds to a different culture.  The world of 
the “True Spirit.  Ethical Life,” which for Hegel was exemplified by the Antigone, is Greek. The 
world of “Self-Alienated Spirit.  Culture,” which stretches from rise of the absolutist state, 
through the Enlightenment, to the Terror, is French. The world of the “Self-Certain Spirit: 
Morality,” from Kant to the Beautiful Soul, is German.  When Hegel discussed eighteenth 
century philosophy in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy he provided a more nuanced 
account, stressing that the Enlightenment had both French and German branches and that they 
lead to rather different results.  Hence, there is no longer an inevitable path that leads from the 
Enlightenment to the Terror.104  Likewise, the Lectures on the Philosophy of History emphasized 
the atypicality of the French experience:  they were cursed with a philosophy that could not help 
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but remain “formal” and “abstract” since it sprung from a culture that had never undergone a 
Reformation.  As a result, the French Enlightenment was thrown into a struggle against both 
Church and State, while in Germany Enlightenment was carried out “on the side of theology” 
and was thus more favorably disposed towards the political and social order that confronted it.105  
Hegel’s later discussion of the relationship between enlightenment and revolution provided a 
much better history than the breathless survey offered in the Phenomenology.  It acknowledged 
the diversity of forms taken by the Enlightenment and gave due consideration to the unique set of 
circumstances that produced the French Revolution.  Yet it is an account that could hardly claim 
to be novel.  Though Hegel nowhere acknowledges it, much of what he was saying had already 
been said (among many others) by that purveyor of “asthenic salads,” Jakob Salat.106 
The author of the Phenomenology had no solution to the fateful problem that drove the 
Revolution into Terror.  The older Hegel was able to loosen the knot that bound the 
Enlightenment to the Revolution because, in the years following the publication of the 
Phenomenology, he had found a different way of treating the problem of reconciling the 
particularity of the individual with the general will of the community.  In the various system 
drafts that led up the Phenomenology he had regularly invoked the image of Theseus when 
forced to explain how the self-seeking bourgeois could be turned into a public-minded citoyen.   
In lectures given at Heidelberg between 1818 and 1819 he used, for the first time, the category of 
“civil society” [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] to denote a domain, situated between the private world 
of the family and the public domain of the state, where individuals meet as free and independent 
creatures of need and carriers of rights, giving free play to their uniqueness and peculiarity while, 
behind their backs, the universal shapes and forms them according to a system of laws that it is 
the task of political economy to map.107  Through the anonymous mechanisms of civil society 
“particularity is educated up to subjectivity” and the bourgeois  learns to become a citoyen.108 
With the problem of reconciling bourgeois particularity and civic universality apparently 
solved, the Terror lost much of sting.  By 1820 Hegel was able to conclude (prematurely, as it 
turned out) that the age of revolutions was at last over.  The riddle which had tormented it had 
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been solved:  where the Terror could only crush individuality, the modern state had found, in a 
civil society distinct from the state, a way to allow for the free play of every type of idiosyncrasy 
without threatening the coherence of political life.109  In the modern world, it was possible to live 
simultaneously as a bourgeois and a citoyen.  With this solution, Hegel’s long struggle to make 
sense of the Terror had come to an end. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 Das einzige Werk und Tat der allgemeinen Freiheit ist daher der Tod, und zwar 
ein Tod, der keinen inneren Umfang und Erfüllung hat; … er ist also der kälteste, platteste Tod, 
ohne mehr Bedeutung als das Durchhauen eines Kohlhaupts oder ein Schluck Wassers.”  G. W. 
F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt:  
Suhrkamp, 1970), III:436 [trans. by A. V. Miller as Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1977), 360]  (translation modified). 
2 As a Swabian, Hegel would have been familiar with the Kohlhobel, a kitchen 
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